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Abstract 
The intent of this research is to gather together the various approaches for 
controlling and reducing total ownership cost (TOC) and to describe tools and 
methods to assist PMs and others in addressing TOC more effectively. This study 
examines TOC from the perspective of congressional direction, the perspective of 
the OSD and Service leadership’s governance, the perspective of PM execution, 
and the perspective of available infrastructure support. 
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Introduction 
This report extends our research that was first published in 2003 (Boudreau & 
Naegle, 2003). At that time, just as currently, significant attention was being paid to 
total ownership cost (TOC). A number of initiatives were collected and shared on a 
TOC website constructed by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA; www.ida.org). 
Additionally, the DAU Acquisition Community Connection website 
(https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=22509&lang=en-US) also contains 
useful approaches to TOC and R-TOC. Looking over the TOC landscape in 2003, 
one would not conclude that there was a shortage of ideas related to reducing TOC. 
The same appears true today—there are many useful approaches for reducing TOC, 
or weapon system life-cycle costs, reflecting the increasing anxiety over 
skyrocketing costs of ownership. Many aspects of defense acquisition have 
continued to evolve, making it difficult to know what has helped to control costs and 
what may have had the opposite effect or had no significant effect. The following 
paragraphs provide a few examples to help make the point. 
There are increased acquisition reviews (Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2008). PMs and those working 
in program offices know that reviews are expensive and divert attention from other 
management activities. Have increased reviews contributed to increased cost or 
have they reduced it? Has developmental cost increased while the larger 
sustainment costs have decreased? Does anyone really know? 
Acquisition reforms, launched in the mid-1990s, resulted in many changes to 
the way we do acquisition business. For example, acquisition programs have 
reduced their preparation for sustainment. MIL-STD-1388-2A and -2B, which 
became obsolete under the Acquisition Reform initiatives of the 1990s, were very 
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mandatory until circa 1995.1 These standards governed supportability analyses and 
served to inform sustainment planning, but they were onerous requirements and 
sometimes resulted in analyses that languished on the shelf and were never put to 
use. Did the discontinued use of these standards result in the de-emphasis and de-
funding of rigorous sustainment planning, in turn causing an increase in the cost of 
sustainment and a corollary reduction in warfighting system readiness? 
Another Acquisition Reform initiative during the mid-1990s created a bias 
against purchasing technical data packages (TDPs).2 Did that result in the 
avoidance of unnecessary and unneeded TDPs, or might this initiative have 
prevented the purchase of technical data, leaving a program with few good options 
related to re-buys and purchase of repair parts? Did it narrow the range of choices 
related to component- and system-level maintenance?  
Has performance-based logistics (PBL)—mandated in the DoD by the QDR in 
September 2001 and implemented in 2002 (USD[AT&L], 2002)—reduced the cost of 
sustainment or has it increased those costs? Coupled with early tech data choices, 
have logisticians been forced into choices that make sustainment more expensive 
throughout the weapon system’s life cycle (Kratz & Buckingham, 2010)? 
First Gut Question 
Have Acquisition Reform and Acquisition Excellence initiatives removed acquisition 
controls and opened up an array of poor choices for PMs that have increased 
system life-cycle costs (LCC)? Might well-meaning Acquisition Reform and 
                                            
1 In the mid-1990s, there were numerous Acquisition Reform initiatives intended to streamline acquisition 
processes and reduce cost. One of these initiatives was “specs and standards” reform. Many government specs 
were rescinded to reduce the government burden and cost of maintaining specs; in many cases, the government 
switched to commercial specifications that were maintained by various technical societies or associations. Other 
mandatory specs were rescinded because they were thought unnecessary or provided insufficient benefit for the 
cost expended. MIL-STD 1388-2A and -2B were thought by some to fall into the latter category. 
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Acquisition Excellence initiatives have offered shortcuts that have ended badly 
(Kratz & Buckingham, 2010)? 
Second Gut Question 
Has one of the principal problems been lack of discipline? In our 2003 paper 
(Boudreau & Naegle, 2003), we addressed leadership resolve and the need to 
speak with one voice about affordability. In 2003, the new JCID’s directives did not 
emphasize affordability. Today those directives do (for example, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2009a, Enclosure A, paragraph 2-b and Enclosure B, 
paragraph 3-d; CJCS, 2009b, Enclosure G, paragraph 1-d and Appendix A to 
Enclosure G, paragraph 16; Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act [WSARA], 
2009, § 201). Yet acquisition professionals must ask, do user study groups 
understand their emerging system’s slice of mission area funding over its life cycle? 
Do users take ownership control of these costs by establishing key performance 
parameters (KPPs) or key system attributes (KSAs) for operations and support O&S 
cost or system life-cycle cost? Do SoS and net-centric system PMs understand and 
account for TOC drivers associated with system changes (especially software) that 
impact system platforms and platform changes that impact overarching systems? Do 
materiel developers insist on clear, unambiguous sustainment cost goals and 
establish solid, well-reasoned CAIV targets? Do contractors structure their 
developments to deliver warfighting systems that meet customer cost constraints? A 
dominant problem might be discipline—cost discipline—starting with the OSD and 
Service leadership and including users, materiel developers, and contractors. 
Third Gut Question 
Is ownership cost data being collected and placed in databases that facilitate 
analysis and comparison to ownership cost targets such that, program by program, 
interested parties can see whether DoD programs are performing within their 
affordability constraints? Acquisition leaders must be able to measure cost 
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sufficiently accurate and detailed that it can be used to suggest where system, 
subsystem, or component improvements are needed. 
Congressional Intervention 
Interestingly, the questions posed in the previous sections appear to have 
been congressional questions, too. Congress already seems to have responded to 
an array of similar concerns, in its own unique way. This is what the WSARA of 2009 
is all about. This is what Congress is addressing in its changes to Nunn–McCurdy. 
This is what motivated Congress to require certificates at Milestones A and B (10 
U.S.C. § 2366a, b). This appears to be the congressional motive in Public Law 111-
84 (National Defense Authorization Act, 2009), which institutes product support 
managers. Having witnessed a lack of cost and process discipline spanning many 
years, particularly in the area of sustainment costs, Congress has acted to enforce 
discipline, instituting procedures with force of law to get weapon system costs under 
control. 
The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 is a congressional 
initiative to increase rigor in development of DoD Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs). The principal intent seems directed at controlling the ownership 
cost of the DoD’s warfighting systems. The WSARA advances on a number of 
different fronts, as follows.  
The WSARA named a series of appointive positions in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) that would have key authorities and responsibilities 
in controlling the acquisition process. One such position is the Director of Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation (Director CAPE), who has major 
responsibilities in the areas of cost estimating and analysis, and providing advice in 
planning PPBE, advising the JROC, and formulating study guidance used to conduct 
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responsibilities place the Director CAPE in a position to provide advice and direction 
related to the accuracy of acquisition cost estimates and the affordability of 
acquisition programs. The Director CAPE is charged by Congress with ensuring the 
accuracy of cost estimation and cost analysis by prescribing policies and procedures 
specifically related to acquisition programs. The Director CAPE provides guidance to 
and consults with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) leadership and the 
secretaries of the military departments regarding specific cost estimates and cost 
analyses to be conducted for a major MDAP or major automated information system 
(MAIS) program. 
JROC 
The WSARA (2009) specifically charges the SECDEF to ensure that the 
JROC is engaged in consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives (§ 201). In our 2003 R-TOC report (Boudreau & Naegle, 
2003), we noted that the JROC was not focused on TOC and that the leadership 
was not “speaking with one voice” (p. 49) concerning the importance of TOC. This 
issue now appears to have been addressed as a matter of law. 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
The WSARA mandates that MDA ensure appropriate trade-offs among cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives to increase confidence that the program is 
affordable (WSARA, 2009, § 201).  
Competition Throughout the Life Cycle 
The WSARA identifies 10 different approaches that may be incorporated into 
an MDAP acquisition strategy to ensure competition be used if cost effective 
(WSARA, 2009, § 202). The list includes competitive prototyping; dual-sourcing; 
unbundling of contracts; use of modular, open architecture to enable competition for 
upgrades; use of build-to-print approaches; and acquisition of complete TDPs—
along with several other approaches. These suggested measures involve 
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as appropriate. The WSARA views competition as extending into operations and 
sustainment of MDAPs. 
The WSARA of 2009 Summary 
There is no doubt that the demands made in WSARA have increased the 
rigor and discipline required in acquisition and will be reflected in more careful cost 
estimation, increased caution in reviewing technological maturity before advancing 
programs to the next acquisition step or phase, better systems engineering and test 
planning, and renewed reliance on competition. All of these facets have the potential 
to better control LCC. Conversely, all the same facets introduce the potential for 
added bureaucracy and unnecessary delay. The WSARA initiatives address past 
shortcomings in MDAP acquisitions that have contributed to the increase of LCC. 
Whether these initiatives will reduce cost through better management or increase 
cost through additional bureaucracy remains to be seen. 
Many other facets of WSARA are described in our 2011 paper, Total 
Ownership Cost—Tools and Discipline (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011). 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 
Section 805 
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 has special relevance to 
life-cycle cost, as will be explained. In this law, Congress mandated product support 
manager (PSM) participation in MDAPs. The law emphasized that the PSM works 
for the PM, but is also specifically tasked to focus on product sustainment (O&S) 
cost. The PSM is tasked to balance PBL support for optimization. He or she must 
review and revalidate product support strategies prior to a change in strategy or 
every five years (National Defense Authorization Act, 2010, § 805). The 
congressional conferees recognized that product support encompasses a wide 
range of logistics functions, including readiness, reliability, availability, and logistics 
burden (footprint) reduction—all of which explicitly or implicitly impact ownership cost 
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apparently established a position within the MDAP PM office that is responsible for 
sustainment cost, to include reliability, which directly influences sustainment cost. 
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2009, Section 814: Configuration Steering Boards for Cost 
Control Under Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
This law introduced a strong bias toward limiting design changes to systems. 
Note that the Service user representative is not named as a member of the 
Configuration Steering Board (CSB). The presumption may be that the user would 
tend to encourage requirements growth and costly changes. The CSB, for its part, 
will listen to the proposed change and make the board’s recommendations to the 
program MDA. In Part 2, the PM is directed to propose de-scoping options to reduce 
cost and requirements. The MDA is required to coordinate changes with the Joint 
Staff and component requirements officials (i.e., user representatives). The wording 
clearly indicates a bias against introducing changes that will increase cost, or at the 
least deferring such changes to a future block or increment. 
Relevant Studies and Reports 
GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123 and Other GAO Reports on Knowledge 
Point Management 
Knowledge point management can be used to avoid program delays and the 
additional cost that accompanies schedule delays. For more than 12 years the GAO 
has advocated the use of knowledge point management to guide development of 
warfighting systems and to control the advancement of programs until those systems 
have demonstrated their readiness to proceed to the next step in the development 
process (Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes, 1998). The three 
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Knowledge Point 1 occurs near Milestone B. The user’s requirements must 
be synchronized with technology that is mature enough to support the endeavor, 
allow sufficient time scheduled to succeed, and provide sufficient funding to 
complete the development (GAO, 2003, p. 16). This knowledge point became 
relatively better understood when the Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) 
Deskbook was published in 2005 (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science 
and Technology [DUSD(S&T)], 2005). Matching requirements with resources is a 
matter of discipline and having the requisite knowledge before proceeding is 
necessary because if any one of the several elements is absent (such as the 
application of required technologies while they are still immature), the program will 
likely be delayed and the impact on cost may be severe. Continuing GAO reviews 
have shown that Knowledge Point 1 demands enormous discipline that has, 
unfortunately, often been beyond the discipline demonstrated by DoD leadership 
over many years.  
Knowledge Point 2 occurs when the design demonstrates that it is able to 
meet performance requirements. The design must be stable (i.e., 90% of the 
engineering drawings must be complete) and testing must show that the system 
performs at an acceptable level (GAO, 2003, p. 16). This point is verified at the post-
CDR assessment.  
Knowledge Point 3 occurs when the system can be manufactured within cost, 
schedule, and quality targets and operates reliably (GAO, 2003, p. 16). In statistical 
process control terms, critical manufacturing processes are in control and 
consistently producing within quality standards and design tolerances.  
Knowledge point management is not new, but has been an industry practice. 
The same technique can, and should, be applied to DoD system acquisition.  
Evolutionary Acquisition 
The use of evolutionary acquisition fits conveniently with Knowledge Point 1, 
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hoped. Depending on the circumstances, technological immaturity might delay a 
Milestone B decision and the associated program new-start. In some cases, a 
technology that matures more slowly than needed may be substituted by an 
alternative technology that is mature and immediately available. Plainly, this decision 
hinges on whether or not the developing system can result in an increment of useful 
warfighting capability—as determined by the sponsor/user. Even when this happens, 
the program faces a difficult path that requires “extra” milestones that are exhausting 
to program office staff. Such is the nature of evolutionary acquisition—avoiding one 
dilemma and replacing it with another. The evolutionary approach places heavy 
demands on a program office, which must prepare for a series of otherwise 
unnecessary milestones. Is it worth it? 
The logistics impact of evolutionary acquisition cannot be ignored, either. A 
result of evolutionary acquisition will either be multiple configurations or expensive 
modifications/upgrades. Such cost impacts might play out for many years or even for 
the lifetime of the warfighting system. These costs may be associated training 
issues, repair parts configuration issues, software patches, and operational impacts. 
The cost of evolutionary acquisition could conceivably approach or even exceed the 
original cost of the program delay. 
The right answer in acquisition depends on the circumstances. The effect on 
ownership cost should always be one of the metrics used to select the best course 
of action. 
GAO Report 10-717  
In July 2010, the GAO (2010) published Defense Management: DOD Needs 
Better Information and Guidance to More Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating 
and Support Costs of Major Weapon Systems (GAO 10-717). This report painted a 
dreary picture of relevant cost databases. The GAO found that important O&S cost-
estimate documents for aviation systems had not been retained and that there were 
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Visibility and Maintenance of Operations and Support Costs (VAMOSC) databases 
(GAO, 2010, p. 16). Data in VAMOSC and other Service information systems or 
sources was inaccurate and incomplete (GAO, 2010, pp. 16–20). The report stated 
that the important MDAP system life-cycle cost estimates were not being routinely 
retained or updated, nor was there policy requiring that this be done. The GAO 
pointed out that there were no agreed-to O&S cost elements or metrics for tracking 
and assessing actual O&S cost performance for the various categories of weapon 
systems. Additionally, operational costs also were affected by unexpected changes 
in OPTEMPO (specifically, flying hours; GAO, 2010, p. 22). Although both those 
factors might upset budget predictions, they need not upset performance 
predictions; rather, if shown as “cost per usage,” reasonable comparisons might 
show the weapon system’s performance against baseline performance. Cost per 
mile or cost per flying hour or round fired could be compared to early cost estimates, 
as-tested costs, and changes in cost per year. Such comparisons would never be 
perfect, but they would suggest whether a weapon system was performing within the 
expected range.  
Looking specifically at aviation systems across the Services, the GAO 
reported that most systems had no record of O&S cost estimates related to key 
milestone decisions. Two aircraft systems, the Air Force F-22A fighter and the Navy 
F-A 18F/G, did have some recorded O&S cost estimates (GAO, 2010, pp. 24–26). 
The two cited examples suggest the seriousness of O&S cost-estimating inaccuracy 
and/or cost growth. F-22A actual cost per flight hour in 2007 was $55,783—67% 
higher than the $33,762 that had been projected in the 2007 President’s Budget. 
Similarly, on a flight-hour basis, the Navy F-A 18E/F cost $15,346 per flight hour of 
operation—40% higher than the $10,979 predicted in 1999. 
Institute for Defense Analyses Study: The Major Causes of 
Cost Growth in Defense Acquisition  
The 2009 Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study, led by Gene Porter 
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growth between 1995 and 2006. The primary causes of cost growth stemmed from 
two defects: “weaknesses in management visibility, direction, and oversight” and 
“weaknesses in initial program definition and costing” (Porter et al., 2009, pp. ES-6–
ES-14), neither of which was a new phenomenon. Much of the blame for the first 
weakness was “a general lack of discipline” (Porter et al., 2009, p. ES-6). 
Porter et al. (2009) make a series of recommendations that are intended to 
address the causes of cost growth reflected in their study; their recommendations 
are supportive of the goals of the WSARA of 2009 (Porter et al., 2009, pp. ES-15–
ES-18). 
DOT&E Initiative on Reliability Growth 
In his memorandum State of Reliability, J. Michael Gilmore, the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E, 2010), made the link that poor reliability is 
a major contributor to LCC. The implication is that the long-held 28-72 LCC statistics 
could be altered by front-end attention to reliability growth. That is, investing more 
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding in reliability 
improvement at the front end could result in higher reliability components that would 
cost less to operate, malfunctioning less often. The remarkable thing here is that 
program leadership has tried to improve reliability in many, if not all, programs. 
Gilmore (DOT&E, 2010) made reference to a recently published reliability standard, 
ANSI/GEIA-STD-0009, which should be employed. 
Policy Pronouncements 
The OSD implemented the 2009 version of the WSARA on December 4, 
2010, through the USD(AT&L) publication of Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 
09-027 (USD[AT&L], 2009). About 10 months later, on October 21, 2010, the 
USD(AT&L) amended the original document, establishing a date by which the DoDI 
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Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth for ACAT I 
Programs 
Corollary to WSARA implementation, the USD(AT&L) published the 
Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—Obtaining Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending (USD[AT&L], 2010b). The intent of this 
implementation directive was to reach beyond WSARA mandates to obtain greater 
affordability-based decision-making in warfighting system programs. Specifically, its 
goal was to mandate affordability as a requirement. PMs are now required to treat 
affordability as a key performance parameter (KPP) at Milestone A. The affordability 
target is to be stated in two metrics: average unit acquisition cost and average 
annual operating and support cost per unit. These metrics will be the basis for pre-
Milestone B decision-making and systems engineering trade-off analysis to establish 
cost and schedule trade space. Such a mandate requires a database similar to the 
one Roper described (2010, pp. 71–73).  
Recently, there have been other significant directive-type memoranda (DTM) 
that affect ownership cost and affordability. Some of these DTMs are discussed in 
more detail in our 2011 paper, Total Ownership Cost—Tools and Discipline (Naegle 
& Boudreau, 2011). 
A Specific Navy Initiative: Gate Reviews  
The Navy has instituted a series of reviews, termed “gate reviews,” to better 
control program development cost. The Navy Total Ownership Cost Guidebook 
(Department of the Navy [DoN], 2010; published concurrently with SECNAVINST 
5000.2E) depicts a series of 10 gate reviews that stretch across the pre-acquisition 
and acquisition phases and into the sustainment phase. Each gate review asks 
tailored cost questions relevant to the specific life-cycle event (DoN, 2010, pp. 4–
32). The complete array of gate reviews is as follows: 
 Gate 1—Initial Capabilities Document 
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 Gate 3—Capability Development Document  
 Gate 4—System Design Specification 
 Gate 5—RFP for Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
Contract 
 Gate 6 Reviews—Specifically, Integrated Baseline Review, Post 
Critical Design Review, Capability Production Document, Pre-Full 
Rate Production Decision Review, and Sustainment Sufficiency 
Review(s) 
At each gate review, formal design review, and assessment, programs must 
demonstrate progress toward their affordability initiatives, with strong consideration 
in mitigation or reduction of TOC. The Navy’s intent is to change the culture from 
what the authors of this working paper perceive as a shortsighted goal of obtaining 
funds for development and procurement to the more complete perspective of total 
life-cycle cost affordability. 
Gate Review 1, which is intended to shape the analysis of alternatives (AoA ) 
study analysis, requires consideration of O&S costs based on current or similar 
systems. TOC guidance for conducting an AoA study is intended to be sufficiently 
detailed to inform and support the selection of a materiel solution from among the 
various AoA candidates. 
Intermediate gate reviews are coupled to existing systems engineering and 
acquisition milestone review points. These reviews become a forum to assess 
whether program trade-offs and decisions are controlling life-cycle cost and whether 
the program is continuing on the correct affordability azimuth. Each of the gate 
reviews requires briefing of specific cost charts, making it unlikely that cost growth 
and schedule slippage can be obscured.  
The Gate 6 Sustainment Review(s), accomplished post-IOC, examine the 
warfighting system’s actual performance data compared to the system’s KPP 
thresholds and the warfighting system’s actual life-cycle cost compared to its prior 
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In the aggregate, gate reviews provide for oversight and governance of 
MDAP system developments. In a wider sense, gate reviews provide a forum for 
lessons learned regarding TOC while controlling the affordability of individual 
systems—and, hence, the broader portfolios of warfighting systems—throughout the 
developmental, production, and sustainment phases of warfighting systems. 
Other Initiatives 
Controls on Software Development 
Driving the Software Requirements and Architectures for System 
Supportability 
While the tools and techniques described in this section were designed for the 
software components, they would be just as effective for any non-software 
component as they are systems engineering (SE)–oriented processes. The systems 
engineering process (SEP) focus used does not attempt to separate software from 
other components, so all system components would benefit from using these tools 
and techniques. 
Software Supportability Analysis 
As with hardware system components, software supportability attributes must 
be designed into the system architecture. Many hardware-oriented engineering fields 
are now quite mature, so that a number of supportability attributes would be 
automatically included in any competent design, even if they were not specified by 
the user community. For example, the state of maturity for the automotive 
engineering field means that, in any automotive-related program, there would be 
supportability designs allowing for routine maintenance of system filters, lubricants, 
tires, brakes, batteries, and other normal wear-out items. There are few, if any, 
corresponding supportability design attributes that would be automatically included 
in even the best software construct. Virtually all of the software supportability 
attributes required must be explicitly specified because they would not likely be 
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software, you get what you specify and very little else. So how does one ensure that 
required software supportability attributes are not overlooked? 
Logistics Supportability Analysis (LSA), performed extremely early, is one of 
the keys for developing the system supportability attributes needed and expected by 
the warfighter. The F/A 18 Super Hornet aircraft was designed for higher reliability 
and improved ease of maintenance compared to its predecessors (“F/A 18,” 2011) 
because of warfighter needs for generating combat power in the form of available 
aircraft sorties. The LSA performed on the F/A 18 determined that a design fostering 
higher reliability and faster maintenance turnaround time (the engines are attached 
to the airframe at 10 locations and can be changed in about 20 minutes by a four-
man team) would result in more aircraft being available to the commander when 
needed. The concept for software LSA is no different, but implementing sound 
supportability analyses on the software components has been, at best, spotty and, at 
worst, completely lacking. 
To assist in effective software LSA, a focus on the following elements is key: 
Maintainability, Upgradeability, Interoperability/Interfaces, Reliability, and Safety & 
Security—MUIRS.  
Maintainability 
The amount of elapsed time between initial fielding and the first required 
software maintenance action can probably be measured in hours, not days. The 
effectiveness and efficiency of these required maintenance actions is dependent on 
several factors, but the software architecture that was developed from the 
performance specifications provided is critical. The DoD must influence the software 
architecture through the performance specification process to minimize the cost and 
time required to perform essential maintenance tasks. 
Maintenance is one area in which software is fundamentally different from 
hardware. Software is one of the very few components in which we know that the 
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reasons why this happens; for instance, there is typically not enough time, funding, 
or resources to find and correct every error, glitch, or bug, and not all of these are 
worth the effort of correcting. Knowing this, a sound plan and resources must be 
available immediately to quickly correct those shortcomings that do surface during 
testing and, especially, those that arise during warfighting operations. Even when 
the system software is operating well, changes and upgrades in other interfaced 
hardware and software systems will drive some sort of software maintenance action 
to the system software. In other words, there will be a continuous need for software 
maintenance in the planned complex SoS architecture envisioned for net-centric 
warfare. 
Because the frequency of required software maintenance actions is going to 
be much higher than in other systems, the cost to perform these tasks is likely to be 
higher as well. One of the reasons for this is that software is not maintained by 
“maintainers,” as are most hardware systems, but is maintained by the same type of 
people that originally developed it—software engineers. These engineers will be 
needed immediately upon fielding, and a number will be needed throughout the 
lifespan of the system to perform maintenance, add capabilities, and upgrade the 
system. There are several models available to estimate the number of software 
engineers that will be needed for support; planning for funding these resources must 
begin very early in the process. Because the DoD has a very limited capability for 
supporting software internally, early software support is typically provided by the 
original developer and is included in the RFP and proposal for inclusion into the 
contract or as a follow-on Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) contract. 
Upgradeability 
A net-centric environment composed of numerous systems developed in an 
evolutionary acquisition model will create an environment of almost continuous 
change as each system upgrades its capabilities over time. System software will 
have to accommodate the changes and will have to, in turn, be upgraded to leverage 
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major role in how effectively and efficiently capabilities upgrades are implemented, 
so communicating the known, anticipated, and likely system upgrades will impact 
how the software developer designs the software for known and unknown upgrades. 
Trying to anticipate upgrade requirements for long-lived systems is extremely 
challenging to materiel developers, but is well worth their effort. Unanticipated 
software changes in the operational support phase cost 50–200 times the cost in 
early design, so any software designed to accommodate an upgrade that is never 
realized costs virtually nothing when compared to changing software later for a 
capability that could have been anticipated. For example, the Army Tactical Missile 
System (ATACMS) Unitary was a requirement to modify the missile from warhead 
air delivery to surface detonation—that is, flying the warhead to the ground. The 
contract award for the modification was $119 million. The warhead was not new 
technology, nor particularly challenging to integrate with the missile body. The vast 
majority of this cost was to reengineer the software to guide the missile to the 
surface. Had there been an upgrade requirement for this type of mission in the 
original performance specification, this original cost (including potential upgrades, 
even if there were 10 other upgrade requirements that were never applied) would 
have been a fraction of this modification cost. 
Interfaces/Interoperability 
OA design focuses on the strict control of interfaces to ensure the maximum 
flexibility in adding or changing system modules, whether they are hardware or 
software in nature. This presupposes that the system modules are known—which 
seems logical, as most hardware modules are well-defined and bounded by both 
physics and mature engineering standards. In sharp contrast to hardware, software 
modularity is not bounded by physics, and there are very few software industry 
standards for modular architecture in software components. This is yet another area 
in which the software developer needs much more information about operational, 
maintenance, reliability, safety, and security performance requirements, as well as 
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defined and clearly communicated, will drive the developer to design a software 
modular architecture supporting OA performance goals. For example, if a system 
uses a Global Positioning System (GPS) signal, it is likely that the GPS will change 
over the life of the system. Knowing this, the software developer creates a 
corresponding discrete software module that is much easier and less expensive to 
interface with, change, and upgrade along with the GPS system. 
With the system software modular architecture developed, the focus returns 
to the interfaces between hardware and software modules, as well as to the external 
interfaces needed for the desired interoperability of the net-centric force. Software is, 
of course, one of the essential enablers for interoperability and provides a powerful 
tool for interfacing systems, including systems that were not designed to work 
together. Software performing the function of “middleware” allows legacy and other 
dissimilar systems to interoperate. Obviously, this interoperation provides a 
significant advantage, but it comes with a cost in the form of maintainability, 
resources, and system complexity. As software interfaces with other components 
and actually performs the interface function, controlling it and ensuring the interfaces 
provide the desired OA capability become major software-management and 
software-discipline challenges.  
One method being employed by the DoD attempts to control the critical 
interfaces through a set of parameters or protocols rather than through active 
management of the network and network environment. This method falls short on 
several levels. It fails to understand and control the effects of aggregating all of the 
systems in a net-centric scheme. For instance, each individual system may meet all 
protocols for bandwidth, but when all systems are engaged on the network, all 
bandwidth requirements are aggregated on the network—overloading the total 
bandwidth available for all systems. In addition, members of the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI; Morris, Levine, Meyers, Place, & Plakosh, 2004) noted, 
While these standards may present a step in the right direction, they 
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they define a minimal infrastructure that consists of products and other 
standards on which systems can be based. They do not define the 
common message semantics, operational protocols, and system 
execution scenarios that are needed for interoperation. They should 
not be considered system architectures. For example, the C4ISR 
domain-specific information (within the JTA) identifies acceptable 
standards for fiber channels and radio transmission interfaces, but 
does not specify the common semantics of messages to be 
communicated between C4ISR systems, nor does it define an 
architecture for a specific C4ISR system or set of systems. (p. 38) 
Clearly, understanding and controlling the interfaces is critical for effective 
interoperation at both the system and SoS levels. The individual PM must actively 
manage all systems’ interfaces impacting OA performance, and a network PM must 
do the same for the critical network interfaces. Due to this necessity of constant 
management, a parameters-and-protocols approach to net-centric OA performance 
is unlikely to produce the capabilities and functionality expected by the warfighter. 
Understanding the software interfaces begins with the software architecture; 
controlling the interfaces is a unique challenge, encompassing the need to integrate 
legacy and dissimilar systems.  This challenge is exacerbated by the lack of 
software interface standards within the existing software engineering environment. 
As stated earlier, the architecture needs to be driven through detailed performance 
specifications, which will help define the interfaces to be controlled. An effective 
method for controlling the interfaces is to intensely manage a well-defined Interface 
Control Document (ICD), which should be a Contract Data Requirements List 
(CDRL) deliverable on any software-intensive or networked system.  
Reliability 
While the need for highly reliable weapon systems is obvious, the impact on 
total system reliability of integrating complex software components is not so obvious. 
Typically, as system complexity increases, maintaining system reliability becomes 
more of a challenge. Add the complexity of effectively networking an SoS (all of 
which are individually complex) to a critical warfighting capability that is constantly 
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Once again, the software developer must have an understanding of reliability 
requirements before crafting the software architecture and developing the software 
applications. Highly reliable systems often require redundant capability, and this 
holds true for software components as well. In addition, software problems tend to 
propagate, resulting in a degradation of system reliability over time. For example, a 
Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 suffered several flight control problems, resulting in 
the following: a near stall situation, contradicting instrument indications, false 
warnings, and difficulty controlling the aircraft in both autopilot and manual flight 
modes. The problems were traced to software in an air data inertial reference unit 
that was feeding erroneous data to the aircraft’s primary flight computer (PFC), 
which is used in both autopilot and manual flight modes. The PFC continued to try to 
correct for the erroneous data received, adjusting flight control surfaces in all modes 
of flight, displaying indications that the aircraft was approaching stall speed and 
overspeed limits simultaneously, and causing wind shear alarms to sound close to 
landing (Dornheim, 2005, p. 46). It is critical for system reliability that the software 
developers understand how outputs from software applications are used by 
interfaced systems so that appropriate reliability safeguards can be engineered into 
the developed software.  
Software that freezes or shuts down the system when an anomaly occurs is 
certainly not reliable nor acceptable for critical weapon systems; yet, these 
characteristics are prevalent in commercially based software systems. Mission 
reliability is a function of the aggregation of the system’s subcomponent reliability, so 
every software subcomponent is contributing to or detracting from that reliability. The 
complexity of software makes understanding all failure modes nearly impossible, but 
there are many techniques that software developers can employ when designing the 
architecture and engineering the applications to improve software component 
reliability. Once requirements are clearly communicated to the developers, the 
software can be engineered with redundancy or “safe-mode” capabilities to vastly 
improve mission reliability when anomalies occur. The key is identifying the reliability 
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Safety and Security 
Very few software applications have the required safety margins associated 
with critical weapon systems used by warfighters in combat situations—where they 
are depending on these margins for their survival. Typically, the software developers 
have only a vague idea of what their software is doing and how critical that function 
is to the warfighter employing the weapon system. Safety performance must be 
communicated to the software developers from the beginning of development so 
they have the link between software functionality and systems safety. For example, 
suppose a smart munition senses that it does not have control of a critical directional 
component, and it calculates that it cannot hit the intended target. The next set of 
instructions the software provides to the malfunctioning system may well be critical 
to the safety of friendly troops, so software developers must have the necessary 
understanding of operational safety to decide how to code the software for what will 
happen next.  
Software safety is clearly linked with reliability since software that is more 
reliable is inherently safer. It is critical that the software developer understands how 
the warfighter expects the software to operate in abnormal situations, in degraded 
modes, and when inputs are outside of expected values. Much commercially based 
software simply ceases to function under these conditions or gives error messages 
that supersede whatever function was being performed, neither of which is 
acceptable in combat operations. 
With software performing so many critical functions, there is little doubt that 
software applications are a prime target for anyone opposing U.S. and Allied forces. 
Critical weapon system and networking software must be resistant to hacking, 
spoofing, mimicking, and all other manner of attack. There must be capabilities for 
isolating attacks and portions of networks that have been compromised without 
losing the ability to continue operations in critical combat situations. The software 
developer must know that all of these capabilities are essential before he or she 
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very influential for the software design and application development. The SEI’s 
Quality Attribute Workshop (Barbacci et al., 2003) states, “As an example, consider 
security. It is difficult, maybe even impossible, to add effective security to a system 
as an afterthought. Component as well as communication mechanisms and paths 
must be designed or selected early in the lifecycle to satisfy security requirements” 
(p. 2). 
Interoperability challenges are increased when the SoS has the type of 
security requirements needed by the DoD. Legacy systems and existing security 
protocols will likely need to be considered before other security architecture can be 
effectively designed. OA capabilities will be hampered by the critical need for 
security; both must be carefully balanced to optimize system performance and 
security. This balance of OA and security must be managed by the DoD and not the 
software developer. 
Physical security schemes and operating procedures will also have an impact 
on the software architecture. For example, many communication security 
(COMSEC) devices need only routine security until the keys, usually software 
programs, are applied; then, much more stringent security procedures are 
implemented. Knowledge of this security feature would be a key requirement of the 
developer; he or she must understand how and when the critical software pieces are 
uploaded to the COMSEC device. The same holds true for weapon systems that 
upload sensitive mission data just prior to launch. 
Residual software on equipment or munitions that could fall into enemy hands 
presents another type of security challenge that needs to be addressed during 
application development. For example, the ATACMS missile air-delivers some of its 
warheads, leaving the missile body to free fall to the surface. It is very conceivable 
that the body could be intact and, of course, unsecured. If critical mission software 
was still within the body and found by enemy forces, valuable information might be 
gleaned from knowing how the system finds its targets. The government would 
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anything recovered useless to the enemy, but this is a capability that is not intuitive 
to software developers (Naegle, 2006, pp. 17–25). 
Effective Software Development Tools Supporting System TOC Analyses 
Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) Quality Attribute Workshop 
(QAW) 
The QAW is designed to help identify a complete (or as complete as possible) 
inventory of system software requirements through analysis of system quality 
attributes. One of the intents is to develop the derived and implied requirements from 
the user-stated requirements, which is a necessary step when user-stated 
requirements are provided in terms of capabilities needed as prescribed by the Joint 
Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process. A system’s TOC, 
and those elements that contribute to TOC, are system quality attributes. Although 
obviously important to the warfighter, the associated operations and support, 
training/education, and facility costs are rarely addressed in much detail and need to 
be derived from stated requirements or augmented with implied requirements 
through the QAW process, or something similar.  
The QAW helps provide a facilitating framework and process designed to 
more fully develop the derived and implied requirements that are critical to clearly 
communicate to potential contractors and software developers. Including a robust 
LSA process using the MUIRS focus elements, described previously, within the 
QAW process will likely significantly improve requirements analysis for those 
associated TOC elements and vastly improve the accuracy of system TOC 
projections. While improving system requirements development, the QAW is 
designed to work with another SEI process called the Architectural Trade-off 
Analysis MethodologySM (ATAMSM) to further improve the understanding of the 
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SEI’s Architectural Trade-Off Analysis MethodologySM (ATAMSM) 
The SEI’s ATAMSM is an architectural analysis tool designed to evaluate 
design decisions based on the quality attribute requirements of the system being 
developed. The methodology is a process for determining whether the quality 
attributes, including TOC attributes, are achievable by the architecture as it has been 
conceived before enormous resources have been committed to that design. One of 
the main goals is to gain insight into how the quality attributes trade off against each 
other (Kazman, Klein, & Clements, 2000, p. 1). 
Within the systems engineering process (SEP), the ATAMSM provides the 
critical requirements loop process, tracing each requirement or quality attribute to 
corresponding functions reflected in the software architectural design. Whether 
ATAMSM or another analysis technique is used, this critical SEP must be performed 
to ensure that functional- or object-oriented designs meet all stated, derived, and 
implied warfighter requirements. In complex systems development, such as weapon 
systems, half or more than half of the total software development effort will be 
expended in the architectural design process. Therefore, DoD PMs must ensure that 
the design is addressing requirements in context and that the resulting architecture 
has a high probability of producing the warfighters’ JCIDS stated, derived, or implied 
requirements. 
The ATAMSM focuses on quality attribute requirements, so it is critical to have 
precise characterizations for each. To characterize a quality attribute, the following 
questions must be answered: 
 What are the stimuli to which the architecture must respond? 
 What is the measurable or observable manifestation of the quality 
attribute by which its achievement is judged? 
 What are the key architectural decisions that impact achieving the 
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The ATAMSM scenarios are a key to providing the necessary information to 
answer the first two questions, driving the software engineer to design the 
architecture to answer the third. This is a critical point at which all of the MUIRS 
elements need to be considered and appropriate scenarios developed. 
The ATAMSM uses three types of scenarios: use-case scenarios involve 
typical uses of the system to help understand quality attributes in the operational 
context; growth scenarios involve anticipated design requirements, including 
upgrades, added interfaces supporting SoS development, and other maturity needs; 
and exploratory scenarios involve extreme conditions and system stressors, 
including Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) scenarios (Kazman 
et al., 2000, pp. 13–15). As depicted in Figure 1, the scenarios build on the 
foundation provided in the JCIDS documents and requirements developed through 
the QAW process. These processes lend themselves to development in an 
Integrated Product Team (IPT) environment led by the user/combat developer and 
including all of the system’s stakeholders. The IPT products will include a set of 
scenarios, prioritized by the needs of the warfighter for system capability. The 
prioritization process provides a basis for architecture trade-off analyses. When fully 
developed and prioritized, the scenarios provide a more complete understanding of 
requirements and quality attributes in context with the operation and support 
(including all of the MUIRS elements) of the system over its life cycle. A more 
complete understanding of the system’s TOC elements should emerge from this 
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Figure 1. QAW & ATAMSM Integration Into Software Life-Cycle Management 
Just as the QAW process provides a methodology supporting the RFP, 
source-selection activities, and the Software Specification and System 
Requirements Reviews (SSR and SRR), the ATAMSM provides a methodology 
supporting design analyses, test program activities, and the System Functional and 
Preliminary Design Reviews (SFR and PDR). The QAW and ATAMSM methodologies 
are probably not the only effective methods supporting software development efforts, 
but they fit particularly well with the DoD’s goals, models, and SEP emphasis. The 
user/combat developer (blue arrow block in Figure 1) is kept actively involved 
throughout the development process—providing key insights the software developer 
needs to successfully develop warfighter capabilities in a sustainable design for 
long-term effectiveness and suitability. The system development activities are 
conducted with superior understanding and clarity, reducing scrap and rework, and 
saving cost and schedule. The technical reviews and audits (part of the DoD’s 
overarching SEP) are supported with methodologies that enhance both the visibility 
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One of the main goals in analyzing the scenarios is to discover key 
architectural decision points that pose risks for meeting quality requirements. 
Sensitivity points are determined, such as real-time latency performance shortfalls in 
target tracking. Trade-off points are also examined so that TOC impacts resulting 
from proposed trade-offs can be analyzed. The SEI explained, “Trade-off points are 
the most critical decisions that one can make in an architecture, which is why we 
focus on them so carefully” (Kazman et al., 2000, p. 23). 
The ATAMSM provides an analysis methodology that complements and 
enhances many of the key DoD acquisition processes. It provides the requirements 
loop analysis in the SEP, extends the user/stakeholder JCIDS involvement through 
scenario development, provides informed architectural trade-off analyses, and vastly 
improves the software developer’s understanding of the quality requirements in 
context. Architectural risk is significantly reduced, and the software architecture 
presented at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) is likely to have a much higher 
probability of meeting the warfighters’ need for capability, including TOC elements. 
Together, the QAW and ATAMSM provide effective tools for addressing 
problem areas common in many DoD software-intensive system developments: 
missing or vaguely articulated performance requirements, significantly 
underestimated software development efforts (resulting in severely underestimated 
schedules and budgets), and poor communication between the software developer 
and the government (both user and PM). Both tools provide frameworks for more 
detailed requirements development and more effective communication, but they are 
just tools—by themselves, they will not replace the need for sound planning, 
management techniques, and effort. Both the QAW and ATAMSM provide 
methodologies for executing SEP requirements analysis and requirements loop 
functions, effective architectural design transition from user to developer, and SEP 
design loop and verification loop functions within the test-case development. 
A significant product resulting from the ATAMSM is the development of test 
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prioritized. Figure 2 depicts the progression from user-stated capability requirements 
in the JCIDS documents to the ATAMSM scenario development, and finally to the 
corresponding test cases developed. The linkage to the user requirements defined in 
the JCIDS documents is very strong as those documents drive the development of 
the three types of scenarios, and, in turn, the scenarios drive the development of the 
use cases. The prioritization of the scenarios from user-stated KPPs, Critical 
Operational Issues (COIs), and FMECA analysis flows to the test cases, helping to 
create a system test program designed to focus on effectiveness and suitability 
tests—culminating in the system Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). FMECA 
is one of the focus areas that will have a dynamic impact on TOC analysis because 
it will help identify software components that need higher reliability and back-up 
capability. The MUIRS focus helps ensure that TOC elements are addressed in 
design and test. 
 
Figure 2. Capabilities-Based ATAMSM Scenario Development 
The traceability from user-stated requirements through scenario development 
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methodology. The growth scenarios and resulting test cases are particularly suited 
for addressing and evaluating TOC design requirements because the system 
evolves over its life cycle, which is often overlooked in current system development 
efforts. 
The software developer’s understanding of the eventual performance required 
in order to be considered successful guides the design of the architecture and every 
step of the software development, coding, and testing through to the Full Operational 
Capability (FOC) delivery and OT&E. Coding and early testing of software units and 
configuration items is much more purposeful due to this level of understanding. The 
MUIRS and FMECA focus will help the design process for better TOC performance. 
The resulting test program is very comprehensive as each prioritized scenario 
requires testing or other verification methodologies to demonstrate how the software 
performs in each related scenario and satisfies the quality attributes borne of the 
user requirements. The testing supports the SEP design loop by verifying that the 
software performs the functions allocated to it and, in aggregate, performs the 
verification loop process by demonstrating that the final product produces the 
capability identified in the user requirements through operational testing. 
Both the QAW and ATAMSM require the capturing of essential data supporting 
decision-making and documenting decisions made. These databases would be best 
used in a collaborative IT system, as described in the next section. 
Collaborative IT Systems 
Collaborative IT tools are being used today in the private sector to connect 
various stakeholders—designers, logisticians, cost analysts, field service 
representatives (FSRs), system users—who have the need to communicate. Such 
tools could be used to support current and emerging warfighting systems. 
Collaborative tools could be adapted to address reliability and ownership cost 
concerns related to warfighting systems. Tools that facilitate improved 
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solutions to problems. For example, FSRs and users could quickly raise problems to 
technical staff for resolution. Cost analysts could more quickly identify emerging cost 
drivers and initiate business case analyses (BCAs). Production and quality 
technicians could rapidly learn of field defects that are the result of production 
defects. Other FSRs and users could be alerted to emerging problems and be 
armed with advance knowledge that might avert impending failures. 
The reliability improvement process could be enhanced by the use of 
collaborative tools, because of the ease with which LCL professionals could bring 
repair parts databases to bear on design decisions. This would be helped by Pareto, 
that is, a focus on the cost drivers or reliability drivers, especially the expensive 
items that fail more often than predicted. This approach could be used up front in 
pre-acquisition phases, too, by tying in legacy databases that contain performance 
information of similar or predecessor systems.  
Think of the impact to BCA. Cost estimates depend on solid cost databases 
that are continually updated by current systems in order to identify major cost drivers 
that might be candidates for redesign or improved manufacturing processes to 
achieve better reliability and reduced LCC. Collaborative IT could contribute to the 
accuracy and completeness of cost estimates.  
Component improvements that result from collaborative databases would pay 
off in legacy systems, but might deliver a second payoff in reduced ownership cost 
of future systems as well. Collaborative databases could be cross-referenced in an 
architecture that would arrange cost and reliability information in system, subsystem, 
or component databases, enabling better cost estimating of emerging systems. In 
her 2010 article in the Defense Acquisition Review Journal, Marti A. Roper 
discussed the need for databases that support acquisition cost estimates—down to 
subsystem or component levels, showing cost ranges. Such a knowledge base is 
critical for the development of follow-on systems so that known cost drivers can be 
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replacement system. Roper referred to this as capabilities-based parametric data 
analysis (2010, pp. 71–73). 
An example of the potential value of collaborative efforts in improving 
reliability and reducing TOC is the microwave tube on the Aegis program, developed 
in the early 1980s. The tubes were expensive to maintain (an estimated $8.20 per 
operating hour) and ubiquitous (nearly 30,000 units in 2010), and initial reliability 
numbers were lower than expected (as low as 1,300 hours mean time between 
failures [MTBF]). Through a collaborative effort between the PM, NAVSEA, and 
several commercial vendors, design and manufacturing improvements increased the 
MTBF to 40,000–45,000 hours, drastically reducing the associated TOC from $8.20 
to $0.45 per operating hour for all associated Naval combat systems (Apte & 
Dutkowski, 2006, pp. 3–21). 
Collaborative IT tools could potentially be implemented through apps to smart 
handheld devices, such as iPhones, Androids, or Blackberries. These devices, 
which are ubiquitous at systems commands and contractor design and logistics 
facilities, could be very valuable and convenient for FSRs, military maintenance 
personnel, and even users in some environments. 
Very possibly, collaborative IT tools are in use, contributing to better data and 
faster solutions to Service member problems on legacy systems. On its face, the 
DoD needs to embrace such tools to improve the flow of technology, acquisition, and 
logistics information.  
Databases 
The Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR)—
MDAP Systems database is a “virtual” repository used by the acquisition community 
and others to manage MDAP and MAIS systems and to provide relevant information 
about those systems across the DoD. The database arrays Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SAR), Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) reports, 
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program information, such as missions and descriptions, system performance, 
schedules, cost and funding (including operations and support costs), Nunn–
McCurdy breaches, contracts performance, and manufacturing and deliveries. The 
DAMIR database contains some capability to compare programs in terms of cost 
and schedule performance and to summarize cost and schedule information (e.g., 
by warfighting system or Service).  
VAMOSC databases that collect O&S cost information should be improved or 
replaced for better support of cost estimating. Current GAO reports indicate that 
VAMOSC is inaccurate, incomplete, and internally inconsistent. VAMOSC should be 
able to provide data on similar or predecessor systems, subsystems, and 
components in support of programs in development, in addition to providing accurate 
O&S cost performance for legacy systems in their sustainment phase. 
Software component analysis and decision databases, like those that would 
be developed using the QAW and ATAMSM tools, should be required for every 
software-intensive system. Software continues to be a “wildcard” in estimating both 
acquisition costs and O&S costs, so front-end analyses must be improved, 
cataloged, and shared widely through a collaborative environment. 
Collaborative databases to gather enterprise/system/subsystem/component 
cost information should be established to facilitate collaboration among experts who 
are widely dispersed. One can envision collaborative IT systems being employed by 
systems commands and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Such systems could 
support national-level enterprise requirements at one end of the spectrum or 
components at the opposite end. In any case, collaborative IT systems could be set 
up for broad sharing of information that might be useful to developers of new 
systems, to maintainers of legacy systems, or to O&S cost analysts trying to improve 
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Conclusions and Recommendations: Major Thrusts 
to Control TOC 
Many of the TOC initiatives implemented since our TOC research report in 
2003 (Boudreau & Naegle, 2003) are definitely steps in the right direction for 
understanding, assessing, and, ultimately, reducing the TOC financial burden. In this 
research, we have identified several areas that remain as significant hindrances to 
effective TOC assessment and reduction, including conflicting policy guidance, 
inadequate or missing databases, and inadequate process controls for software and 
SoS/net-centric TOC drivers. Future policy and guidance should address these 
shortfalls to more fully address TOC issues. 
Controls  
Cost Estimates 
The DoD has not yet demonstrated its ability to estimate program costs within 
reasonable confidence limits. Estimation of developmental costs is challenging at 
best and is not yet well enough supported by solid cost databases. The addition of 
O&S cost requirements makes sense from the perspective of life-cycle affordability, 
but again, this effort is not supported by sufficient O&S cost databases. The 
development of SoS and net-centric systems exacerbates the cost-estimating 
problem as system-wide changes drive platform costs, but may not be attributable to 
the platform absorbing the cost. Platform changes may also drive system-wide 
changes, again driving costs that are not attributable to the system level. While 
these costs may not be attributable, we recognize that they still need to be tracked 
so that they can be estimated in future developments and so that root-cause 
analyses can be applied to help eliminate the sources in the future. 
Certifications at Milestone A and Milestone B 
The certifications at Milestones A and B, along with the attention of the 
Director CAPE, undoubtedly bring attention and scrutiny to program cost estimates 
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portfolio. The mandate for cost certificates is a major improvement, as compared to 
our 2003 research. Cost certificates are a necessary forcing function to push the 
DoD toward more reliable cost estimating. Again, SoS and net-centric system 
development may add certification challenges as the associated costs are typically 
not foreseeable, and attributing the costs to a specific PM may be difficult. 
Changes to Nunn–McCurdy to Include an O&S Cost Metric 
Unquestionably, Nunn–McCurdy requirements have become more 
demanding and onerous. As challenging as acquisition costs (APUC and PAUC) 
are, they are not the correct metrics when viewed from a life-cycle cost perspective. 
Nunn–McCurdy metrics need to evolve into measures of life-cycle cost, including 
O&S cost portion (e.g., average O&S cost per system per hour or average O&S cost 
per system per mile). To do otherwise is to encourage poor system development 
choices that may add to life-cycle cost rather than constrain it.  
Mandated Reviews 
Moving the PDR Assessment to precede or coincide with Milestone B, as 
mandated in WSARA (2009), should improve decision-making. That is, required 
warfighter capabilities, technological maturity, affordable resources, and available 
schedule must be compatible with the system specification at Milestone B. This 
cannot be properly assured without completion of the preliminary design because 
PDR supports preparation of resource and schedule estimates. To that end, we 
recommend that software-intensive systems employ the SEI’s QAW and ATAMSM 
process tools (or similar-type processes) to accomplish the following: more fully 
define derived and implied software-related requirements; improve the software 
developer’s understanding of how the warfighters use and maintain the system; 
understand how the system is likely to be changed, modified, or made interoperable 
over its life cycle; and improve the developer’s understanding of the performance the 
warfighter expects under stressful or unusual operating scenarios. These process 
tools should vastly improve the reliability of information resulting from the PDR with 
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Technological Maturity 
The Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook (DUSD[S&T], 
2005) was published in 2005 and has greatly clarified understanding of technological 
maturity, yet it is difficult to apply to software development. The DoD has a long track 
record of moving into detailed design after Milestone B without the necessary 
maturity of technology to complete the system design. The result is almost always 
program delays and substantial cost growth. Lack of technological maturity is one of 
the major causes of cost growth and reflects the importance of Knowledge Point 1, 
as described by the GAO (2003). Because software development defies early 
maturity estimation, it must be considered separately and include the maturity 
evaluations of the software developer (CMMI or equivalent), as well as the maturity 
evaluations of the materiel developer/PM (SA-CMM or equivalent). 
Today, we have a useable template to discuss and reach a common 
understanding of technological maturity; we know the importance of technological 
maturity; we have a mandated certification—in law and regulation—to assure the 
intersection of technological maturity, affordability, available budget, and schedule. 
The DoD knows the elements of knowledge that are necessary for sound decision-
making to launch development of a new warfighting system. This also applies to 
COTS or GOTS software, but software development depends on assessing the 
maturity of the developer and the PM office, as stated previously.  
Navy Gate Reviews 
The DoD should require gate reviews for use by all the Services. Gate 
reviews provide for oversight and governance of MDAP life-cycle cost. These 
reviews establish a process to bring attention to ownership cost throughout the 
developmental cycle of warfighting systems. In a wider sense, gate reviews provide 
a forum for lessons learned regarding TOC. While emphasizing affordability through 
the developmental and production phases of individual warfighting systems, gate 
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portfolios, and potentially to assist in balancing resources across all of the 
department’s family of capability portfolios. 
Configuration Steering Boards 
The opportunity to grow requirements for ongoing programs that are beyond 
Milestone B has been largely taken away from the user community and placed into 
the hands of each Service’s Configuration Steering Board. This is likely to curtail 
major cost increases in programs and encourages cost reductions based on PM 
recommendations in program requirements and within program objectives. 
Congressional language on changes to user requirements has been accommodated 
in the most recent version of DoDI 5000.02 (USD[AT&L], 2008), dated December 8, 
2008. Implementation of this guidance entails a major change in culture; whether it is 
successful in reducing ownership cost will be shown over time. 
Performance-Based Logistics 
The DoD is very familiar with the demands of sustainment—but the OSD has 
not insisted on proper planning and implementation of affordable sustainment. The 
OSD has not focused enough on the metrics that indicate success of warfighting 
systems or on the cost to achieve required metrics. Instead, focus has been on 
commodity management, with the DLA being a prime example, where metrics have 
reflected performance of the support organization, but not weapon system 
readiness. 
PBL must be applied more widely, such that non-PBL systems should be an 
unusual occurrence. PBL requirements initially should be analyzed vertically by an 
individual system such that the warfighting system is able to achieve its mission and 
is affordable. However, PBL arrangements also should be analyzed horizontally to 
take advantage of economic quantities and other efficiencies that might be provided 
by using common support systems. PBL metrics also should be devised to reflect 
the individual warfighting system (i.e., vertical) and the broader support system or 
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